In Bosworth v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered whether exclusion of evidence was necessary when a search warrant was untimely executed. In this case, a court found probable cause for a search warrant and granted it. However, officers did not execute the warrant within the time period allotted under Ind. Code 35-33-5-7(b). The Court of Appeals found that case law in Indiana was silent as it related to the admissibly of evidence found with an untimely executed search warrant. Indiana case law deals more with what happens when the probable cause for supporting the search goes stale rather than what happens if the search warrant is executed outside the 10 day mark. Given there was no case law on the subject, the Court of Appeals consulted Federal law and found that unreasonable delay in the execution of a search warrant that results in the lapse of probable cause will invalidate a warrant. That alone does not require exclusion but if the defendant is prejudiced or if reckless disregard for proper procedure exists then exclusion may be proper. Bosworth did not claim that probable cause had dissipated due to the delay, did not allege any misconduct by the police nor did he argue that he was prejudiced by the delay. Therefore the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision for allowing the evidence to be admitted. 24A-CR-2688 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2026). Read the full opinion at

public.courts.in.gov/decisions

In M.V. v. D.C.S, the Appellate Court determined that the Trial Court’s sua sponte determination did not comport with the law. The Trial Court’s own determination did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) but instead simply recited what was testified to at the hearing. This was not determining whether this testimony was true, but rather just accepting it as true. The case was remanded for a proper findings of fact and conclusions of law to be entered. (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2026) 25A-JC-1223. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions

Velasquez brought on appeal issues of whether evidence was properly excluded, properly included and whether the sentence was appropriate in Velasquez v. State. The first issue dealt with the exclusion of a witness’ testimony which would have potentially discredited part of the State’s case. However, the offer of proof was did not include all the elements (the substance of the testimony, relevance of the testimony, and grounds for admitting it) so the issue was not properly preserved for review on appeal. The second issue dealt with Velasquez’ statements to the officers. What was in dispute here was that the Miranda Warnings, while given and given in Spanish, Velasquez stated that it was in uncommon Spanish. The Court of Appeals determined that it was properly given because it was read and explained to Velasquez by an officer whose first language was Spanish. Finally, the Court considered whether the sentence was appropriate and found that in light of the aggravators and mitigators presented the sentence was fine. 24A-CR-2904 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan 9, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions

In Hunt v. State, Hunt challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as well as his sentence. At trial, there was only one pill out of the bag tested but Hunt was convicted for over 10 grams of drugs. The Appellate Court upheld the conviction because all the pills were similarly marked and Hunt told officers the pills were one type of pill but would test positive for another. Hunt’s sentence was also upheld because he had prior history, was unsuccessful on probation and the offense was committed while on parole. 25A-CR-1260 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan 9, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part Evans convictions in Evans v. State. The question on the reversed charges was whether the State presented evidence of obscenity as defined by Article 49 (and factually charged in his counts). While the State proved a definition of obscenity, it was not the same definition under the factual charge. Other chargers were upheld. 25A-CR-1416 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions

In Alexander v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals had to determine whether a communication was protected under the First Amendment. In this case, Alexander was contacting an ex for three years after being asked to stop. In some of these messages threats were made. Because the communications did not have a legitimate intent the harrassment conviction was upheld. Because some of the messages were considered a true threat, they were not protected by the First Amendment. 25A-CR-1616 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions

In Williams v. State, the question was whether pre-trial GPS monitoring was considered confinement and those days eligible to put toward Williams’ sentence. The Indiana Court of Appeals determined it was not. The Appellate Court considered the restriction of freedom Williams had while on pre-trial GPS monitoring and found that there wasn’t much. Specifically, the device only tracked Williams’ location and did not restrict where Williams went. Additionally, Williams voluntarily accepted the device in order to secure pre-trial release. 25A-CR-687 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions

The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for operating while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration equivalent and remanded the case back to the trial court with instruction to enter a different conviction in Stokes v. State. Stokes was charged with three different counts of operating while intoxicated at different levels. The trial court found he did operate while intoxicated and entered conviction for the count including a finding that his alcohol concentration equivalent was equal to or higher than .15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. However, on appeal Stokes was able to show that the State failed to prove the blood draw was taken within 3 hours of the accident and thus could not be related back to the time of driving. Because of being outside the window for allowing for the presumption allowed under Indiana Law, the Appellate Court reversed the conviction for operating while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .15 or more but remanded the case with instruction to enter a conviction for one of the other two counts of operating while intoxicated which did not require a finding of specific scientific blood alcohol levels. 25A-CR-1740 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan 30, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions