September 2025
The Indiana Court if Appeals reviewed a case in Indianapolis Public Trans. Co. v. Bush. In that case Bush filed a wrongful death claim and a jury found in favor of Bush. IndyGo argued that the deceased was contributory negligent and as a matter of law not entitled to relief. The trial court denied the motion, the jury found in favor of Bush and IndyGo appealed. The Appellette Court stated that it would only overturn if the evidence, when considered in favor of Bush, did show the deceased was contributorily negligent. The evidence reviewed did not show obvious negligence from the deceased. Since the jury was in the best place to view the evidence and ask questions at the trial level the Appellette Court determined that it would follow the jury’s finding. No. 25S-CT-245, N.E.3d (ind., App. Ct.) Sept 15, 2025. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In Cingel v. Ferrari, the Indiana Appellette Court discussed the growing impact on briefs helped out or drafted by A.I. (rather than discussing sports cars). The trial court ruled on a contested divorce. Cingel moved to correct an error on the ruling and was denied. Cingel then appealed the ruling. The Appellette Court read her brief and found that of the 23 citations she gave, 14 did not exist. And of the 9 that did, 6 were cited incorrectly. Because of the blatant disregard for trial rule 46 (the content of briefs), the Court deemed her to have waived her appellate claims. The Court also warned about the growing use of A.I. problems and noted that attorneys and pro se litigants have been sanctioned for improper use of A.I. information. No. 25A-DC-500, N.E.3d (Ind. Ct. App., September 19, 2025). Check out the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov.decisions.
The Indiana Appellette Court recently reviewed a question of how removal to Federal Court affects the time deadlines on Trial Rule 56 in Noons v. First Merchants Bank. In the case, Noons argued that removal to Federal Court tolled the deadline in which to respond to a motion for summary judgement. The Appellette Court agreed and stated that until the jurisdiction was of the federal court was terminated, the state courts case was tolled. After the jurisdiction returned to the state court is when the filing deadlines pick up from where they left off. No. 25aa-CC-419 N.E.3d (Ind.Ct.App. Sept. 19, 2025). To see the full opinion go to public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
The Indiana Appellette Court issued an opinion in Rosenbough v. State where it decided that Rosenbough’s efforts to appeal the sentence were timely. In determining this the court balanced whether Rosenbough followed the trial courts instructions, the significance of his liberty interest, the unique combination of the other factors and judical economy. While the Court concluded he timely appealed, it also found that the trial court’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion as Rosenbough admitted to the probation violations. 24A-CR-1576. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In another Indiana Appellette Court case, the Court affirmed the conviction of the Defendant in Dirig v. State. The Court found sufficient evidence that the defendant acted knowingly (that he was subjectively aware of a high probability that his actions would lead to the result). The Court also noted that while some of the instructions given were given incorrectly (civil instructions for a criminal trial) the correct definition for knowingly was also given so the jury had the proper law in front of them. 25A-CR-119. Read the full opinion at public courts.in.gov /decisions.
In Barbee v. State, the Appellate Court considered whether the trial court’s sentence of 125 years was appropriate given Barbee’s lack of pre-frontal cortex development. The Court of Appeals determined that the sentence was inappropriate given this lack of full development and modified the sentence to 110 years. The Court weighed the age of Barbee in light of Barbee’s history and concluded that 55 years for the underlaying offense with an additional 55 years for the enhancing circumstances was appropriate. 24A-CR-2317. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
Another Indiana Appellate Court case considered again how the term “forcible” modifies resist. In McNary v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for resisting law enforcement using Spangler v. State once again as the controlling case. The court in McNary found that none of her actions constituted strong, powerful violent means used to evade officer’s lawful duties. The actions were walking into the bedroom and standing by a dresser, verbal statements about not going to jail, refusing to place hands behind her back and attempting to move toward another person. Because the movement toward the other person was not force directed at the officers, it was not considered resisting and the officer’s force to get her incompliance did not establish that she forcibly resisted. 25A-CR-781. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In State v. Poland, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the granting of a motion to suppress a warrantless blood draw. The officer, having to deal with a chaotic car accident and under the suspicion of an intoxicated driver, had the hospital draw the driver’s blood without the driver’s consent and without a warrant. The Court analyzed whether the officers actions violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The Court concluded that neither were violated. Due to the exigent circumstances of blood naturally dissipating over time with the time delay that would have been getting the warrant, the Court decided this was appropriate action under the Federal analysis. For Indiana, the Court weighed the Litchfield factors and found that the State’s interest of of removing impaired drivers from the road along with the high degree of concern with the accident, and the intrusion to the driver was minimal as the driver was already being treated at the hospital. Taking all these into consideration the Court concluded there was no violation under either analysis. 24A-CR-2252 Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In Johnson v. State, another Indiana Appellate Court decision, the Court reversed a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss charges. Johnson was charged with handgun offenses which enhancements. The State provided in their charging information the name of the prior case along with a cause number and the relevant Indiana code, but not the code for the out of state conviction. The Court used the substantially similar test from State v. Hancock 63 N.E. 3d 585 (Ind. 2016) and found that the first handgun charge was sufficiently plead to in the charging information even without the full details. The prior conviction was similar in substance to what would have enhance the charge in Indiana, had the conviction been in Indiana. As for the second handgun charge, the Court noted that the Hancock test did not apply as it did not require a specific enhancement but rather just proof of a prior felony conviction that was punishable by at least a year. 24A-CR-2146. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In Davidson v. Hammond, the Indiana Appellate Court decided that Hammond did not waive her right to a jury trial in a small claims court. The Statute states that while a person must make a jury trial demand within a specific time, the fee to transfer the case to a jury trial court does not happen until after the home court grants the jury trial demand. Because Hammond filed the appropriate jury trial request she did not waive her right to a jury trial when the home court deemed her to waived for failure to pay the transfer fee. Instead the home court should have granted her request and assessed the transfer fee. 25A-SC-879 N.E.3d. (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2025). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
We don’t get enough opinions about adverse possession but on Sept 30, 2025, the Indiana Court of Appeals published on in Brown v. Charles Sturdevant Post of the American Legion Post #46. In this the case, the Legion believed they were the owners of a particular parcel of property and built a fence around it, built a patio on it and hosted events on the same property. Brown challenged this acquisition three years after Brown acquired property behind the Legion. The Trial Court and Appellate Court determined that adverse possession was proper and found in favor of the Legion. Adverse possession was proper because the Legion demonstrated their intent to claim ownership by building the fence/patio, provided construction notice to the owners to show notice, and showed control over the land as it’s use was exclusive to members. The only element up for debate was the duration requirement and the Court found that while it did not meet the 10 years against one particular owner, the statute does not require that the 10 years be against one particular owner but rather just 10 continuous years. 25A-PL-513 NE.3d. Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.