February
In Adkins v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals looked at whether a dog sniff’s alert was sufficient to establish probable cause of a vehicle search under the totality of the circumstances test. The question here arises from being able to distinguish between legal hemp and illegal marijuana. However, the Court explained that there are other factors to be considered under the TOC test. The Court looked at the fact that Adkins was stopped for driving on a suspended licenses, having active warrants, leaving a known drug house, and then the trained police dog alerted. The dog was trained to alert for a number of illegal substances. So even though the dog was not trained to distinguish between legal hemp and illegal marijuana, it did alert to one of the substances it was trained on. That along with the other factors created probable cause under the TOC test. 24A-CR-2140 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb 6, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions
In an Indiana Court of Appeals case, the issue was which parenting order was the controlling order. In re Te.W. The CHINS court closed the case due to compliance and issued an order establishing parenting time. This was appealed and argued that since the CHINS case was closed the CHINS parenting time order was no longer valid. The Court of Appeals agreed and stated that once that case was closed the paternity court governs. Because only the CHINS case order was challenge, the issue was deemed moot. 25A-JC-2257. (Ind. Ct. App. Feb 6, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a decision by a trial court for regular commitment in In re Commitment of P.P. In this case, P.P. was hospitalized and the hospital filed a petition for temporary commitment. At the hearing, the doctor testified that P.P. experienced decompensation in the past and requested a regular commitment. This was granted. The Court of Appeals stated that because the petition did not originally ask for regular commitment and P.P. was not already under a temporary commitment order, P.P.’s due process rights were violated and remanded the case back to the trial court. 25A-MH-1592 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.court.in.gov/decisions.
In Van Hawk v. State, the Court of Appeals upheld his conviction and sentence. Van Hawk raised six issues all of which failed. The first was whether he was denied a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4 (B) and (C). The Court found that much of the delay in his case was caused by his own actions and not attributable to CR4. Next there was an issue of joining the counts together in one trial. The Court of Appeals stated that because he failed to renew this motion at trial he waived it, additionally, he did not show prejudice. Another issues waived was the trial date being advanced. Because Van Hawk did not request a continuance day of trial when the date was advanced it was deemed waived. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court adequately supplied him with accommodations to supplement his hearing impairments. The waiver of counsel was properly done and the Court of Appeals agreed that Van Hawk was not entitled to standby counsel. 24A-CR-3161 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb 6, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In re S.V., discussed whether the trial court’s findings were erroneous. The trial court found that it was necessary to intervene when S.V. was undergoing treatment which was not objectively substantiated by the medical community. The evidence presented showed the opposite, that when the treatment was stopped, S.V. did much better and behaved as one would expect. Because of this, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s finding was not erroneous and that intervention to cease treatment was necessary. 25A-JC-1178 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb 9, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Trial Court’s finding on a hearsay issue in In the Matter of V.H. but also upheld ruling in favor of DCS under the Presumptive Statute. The hearsay issue was whether the nurse could testify as to imaging results. On party objected on grounds that the images were not disclosed during the discovery process. The Court and Court of Appeals found that under the rules of evidence an expert can testify as to what the expert reviewed and how they used that to come to their conclusions. As the nurse was established as an expert under 703, the testimony was allowable. As for the Presumptive Statute, all that DCS had to prove was injury which occurred while under the care and that the injury would not normally occur nor was it reasonably likely to be accidental. CB-10717 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In Wilson v. State, the Court of Appeals took up the issue of whether jerky movements by themselves gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Wilson was intoxicated while he was driving. The Court of Appeals looked at this issue through the lens of the Fourth Amendment and Indiana’s Article I Section 11 and found that it did not. The officer saw Wilson moving in his car while driving in a jerky manor but did not observe any traffic violations. Wilson was pulled over basically on a hunch which was not supported by articulable facts for reasonable suspicion. While the Court of Appeals had to balance public interest of keeping intoxicated drivers off the road, it is also important to protect the right of the people to be free from unfettered police discretion. As there were no other facts to support the stop, the Court of Appeals ruled that the stop should have been suppressed. 25A-CR-1542 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
The Indiana Supreme Court discussed due process rights with respect to probation revocations in Ewing v. State. In this case, Ewing faced an allegation that he violated the terms of his work release sentence by picking up a new case. When he faced the trial court about this and ultimately admitted to the violation the State then also sought to violate his probation. The trial court agreed and revoked his suspended sentence. Ewing appealed arguing that the petition filed was only for violating work release and he did not have notice that he was also facing a revocation of his probation. Eventually, this issue ended up at the Indiana Supreme Court who agreed with Ewing. The Court explained that a prosecutor cannot seek a different sanction than the one that is filed. Meaning they couldn’t file a petition to revoke work release and then at the final hearing also request sanctions for violating probation. Because the probation revocation in this case went beyond what was identified in the petition, it violated Ewing’s due process right to notice of what was being revoked. 26S-CR-43 (Ind. Feb. 16, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In re A.M., was a case where the Indiana Court of Appeals looked at whether or not a determination made by the trial court was based on actual facts present at court. in this case, a fact finding was set for one of the interested parts. The other interested party waived their right to a fact finding hearing and stipulated to the case file from a previous court determination. The party that continued on with the hearing and lost at the trial court lever. On appeal, the Appellate Court saw that the record was based on findings that were copied from the previous court determination rather than new independent facts presented at the fact finding hearing. Despite this notation, the Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion as the trial court and simply noted that there was no reversible error. 25A-JC-2407 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
Shabazz v. State examined whether the trial court applied the correct standard in allowing a witness to testify at trial remotely. In civil cases, if there is particularized and specific actual support for good cause to allow a witness to testify, then it is allowable. However, in a criminal trial, the standard is higher. In a criminal trial a witness should only be allowed to testify if it is to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that would otherwise likely occur. Court efficiency, logistics, or expense are not sufficient when balanced against a person’s constitutional right to cross examination. While the State did not present this evidence and the trial court should have required the witness to testify in person, the error was found to be harmless because the witness’ testimony was cumulative. 25S-CR-183 (Ind. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In another Indiana Supreme Court case, the court considered may different appeals issues from Carr v. State. The first issue was whether there was a violation of Carr’s right to a impartial jury when only three of the 104 potential jurors were of a minority race and only one of them was of the same ethnicity as Carr. The Court ultimately found that Carr failed to present evidence of underrepresentation occurring on a regular basis across multiple panels and failed to show that the randomized computer selection demonstrated systematic exclusion. Next the Court determined that an out of court statement made to officers was not protected by the heresay rules nor the confrontation clause because Carr had forfeited his rights by threatening the witnesses in multiple ways. Another statement was allowed into court and upheld by the Supreme Court as an excited utterance because the person was still agitated by the event and had not had the opportunity for calm cool reflection prior to making the statement. Finally, the Court upheld the sentence because despite some mitigators, the nature of the offense along with the aggravators were enough to conclude the sentence was proper. 23S-LW-139, (Ind. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld an impound search of a vehicle when no impound happened in Strokes v. State. In this case, Strokes was parked at a gas pump when officers arrested him on some outstanding warrants. The gas station attendant asked the officers to remove the vehicle as it was parked at a pump during rush hour. The officers initiated a tow, even though Strokes relative was present and could drive the vehicle. Per officer procedure, whenever a tow happens, the officers are to do an inventory search in order to compile a list of items in the vehicle. The officers did that in this case and found a gun. They ultimately released the vehicle to Strokes relative, but also charged him for the gun. The Court of Appeals upheld the search stating that the procedure was followed despite the tow not being completed. 25A-CR-00531, (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
In Morgan v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction. During trial the trial court had excluded certain information from a deposition under Ind. Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 stating the evidence was too prejudicial to be admitted into trial. However, a full copy of the deposition was sent back with the jury for deliberation accidently. The jurors stated they had seen the deposition and considered it in their determination of guilt. Morgan requested a mistrial but the trial court denied that. The Court of Appeals stated that because the trial court deemed the information too prejudicial, that Morgan had no opportunity to confront or rebut the deposition and the case turned on credibility that there was fundamental error. Based on this error the conviction was reversed. 25A-CR-836 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
Another conviction was reversed and remanded in Gluys v. State. In this case a bench trial was held and Gluys was convicted. However, the trial court used the wrong standard when applying the facts to the law. The State and Gluys agreed the wrong standard was applied. Based on this the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court to apply the correct standard. 25A-CR-1488, (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a tort claim for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs sued Hammond Redevelopment Commission and other officials for use of eminent domain powers. Plaintiffs alleged that the employees acted outside the scope of their employment and as a result they were damaged. However, the Court found that Hammond et. al. were immune from as they are a governmental entity and acting within the scope of their job or in the furtherance of their employer’s business. Indiana Land Trust #3082 and Omar and Haitham Abuzir as Trustees v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission et al., 255-PL-141 (Ind. Feb. 24, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.
Appellate Court decision regarding the commitment of A.D. but clarified the law that should have been required. A.D. was civilly committed and appealed that decision. On Appeals, the Court affirmed the commitment but used the standard for review as being that the trial court’s commitment order represents a conclusion that a reasonable person could have drawn. The Supreme Court clarified that the standard that should have been used is that a civil commitment will be affirmed if considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable inference supporting it without weighing evidence or assessing witness convincing evidence. Where probative evidence is defined as evidence that tends to prove or disprove a point in issue and the existence of the fact must be highly probable. In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of A.D. 265-MH-65 (Ind. Feb 27, 2026). Read the full opinion at public.courts.in.gov/decisions.